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OF MAJORITY COALITIONS AND THE FATE
OF U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS

Stuart Minor Benjamin and Bruce A. Desmarais1

Should a strategic Justice assemble a broader coalition for the majority opinion than is
necessary, even if that means accommodating changes that move the opinion
away from the author’s ideal holding? If the author’s objective is to durably move the
law to his or her ideal holding, the conventional answer is no, because there is a cost and
no corresponding beneﬁt. We consider whether attracting a broad majority coalition can
placate future courts. Controlling for the size of the coalition, we ﬁnd that cases with
ideologically narrow coalitions are more likely to be treated negatively by later courts.
Speciﬁcally, adding either ideological breadth or a new member to the majority coalition
results in an opinion that is less likely to be overruled, criticized, or questioned by a later
court. Our ﬁndings contradict the conventional wisdom regarding the coalition-building
strategy of a rational and strategic opinion author, establishing that the author has an
incentive to go beyond the four most ideologically proximate Justices in building
a majority coalition. And because of later interpreters’ negative reactions to narrow
coalitions, the law ends up being less ideological than the Justices themselves.

1. INTRODUCTION

Does a strategic author of a U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion have a clear
incentive to push for an opinion as close as possible to his or her vision of the

1

Benjamin is the Douglas B. Maggs Professor of Law, Duke Law School; Desmarais is Assistant
Professor, University of Massachusetts Amherst Department of Political Science. E-mail: benjamin@law.duke.edu. David Sparks and Reuben Stob provided tremendous research assistance.
Chris Vasil, long the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court, along with others in the
Supreme Court who prefer to remain anonymous, were invaluable sources of information about
the Court’s practices and history. We would like to thank John Aldrich, Jon Baker, Sara Benesh, Curt
Bradley, Guy Charles, Erwin Chemerinsky, Charlie Clotfelter, John de Figueiredo, Tom Ginsburg,
Mitu Gulati, Dan Klerman, Jack Knight, David Levi, Anup Malani, Jonathan Masur, Kevin McGuire,
Tom Miles, Mike Munger, Eric Posner, Kevin Quinn, Arti Rai, Barak Richman, David Rohde, Chris
Schroeder, Neil Siegel, Georg Vanberg, Neil Vidmar, Ernie Young, and participants at the 2011 USC
Law School Judicial Collegiality Conference for useful comments. Data and R code necessary to
replicate the tables and figures in this article will be provided upon request.

ß The Authors 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and
Business at Harvard Law School.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
doi:10.1093/jla/las016
Advance Access published on August 20, 2012

Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ at Duke University on April 1, 2013

ABSTRACT

446 ~ Benjamin and Desmarais: Standing the Test of Time

2

Note that any given holding entails decisions about its breadth or narrowness as well as its application of law to the facts of the case (to pick two prominent dimensions). Each Justice’s ideal holding
will thus encompass a preferred degree of breadth along with preferred legal reasoning. This highlights the fact that accommodating a potentially dissenting or concurring Justice may entail changes
focused on the breadth of the holding. In Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), for example, the central
intervention in the opinion drafting process identified with Justice O’Connor was the addition of
limiting language (“[o]ur consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities”). 531 U.S. at 109; see
Rosen (2001).
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law? Consider a Justice who, consistent with past findings, has a primary goal of
instantiating his or her vision of the best understanding of the law (Epstein &
Knight 1998; Rohde 1972a, b; Murphy 1964). This Justice has been assigned the
majority opinion in a case and the four colleagues most ideologically similar to
the Justice have joined the draft majority opinion. A few other colleagues
have written memoranda, each stating an unwillingness to join the draft
opinion as written because he or she disagrees with some aspect of it, but a
willingness to join if said aspect were changed. Accepting those changes would
move the opinion further from the author’s ideal holding (i.e., from the
holding that he or she thinks the Court should adopt).2 Should the author
implement some or all of those changes and thereby gain the others’ adherence
to the opinion?
One possible answer is no: once a majority has joined an opinion, the
strategic author should stop there. And in choosing which colleagues to accommodate, the strategic author should select those who will move the opinion the
least distance from his or her understanding of the law. The Justice who
accommodates colleagues more than necessary for a majority is bearing
a cost (moving away from his or her ideal holding) with no corresponding
benefit. This is the conventional wisdom about how strategic Justices should
act, and there is empirical evidence that it is how many of them do act
(Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck 2000; Rohde & Spaeth 1976; Riker 1962).
Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck (2000, 95) provide anecdotal evidence of
this behavior, quoting Thurgood Marshall in a conference memorandum:
“Since seven of us agree, my current plan is not to make the change suggested
in the Chief’s ultimatum.” Also, Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck (2000, 121)
find that “[o]nce at least a majority of justices have joined the majority
opinion, authors are less likely to accommodate responsively. Before the
author receives majority support for an opinion, he or she has a 90.1%
chance of circulating an additional draft. After receiving enough support to
set binding precedent, the author is only 68.6% likely to continue his or her
coalition-building efforts.” Justice Rehnquist (1987) noted that “[t]he willingness to accommodate on the part of the author of the opinion is often directly
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This was also the experience of one of the authors as a clerk on the Supreme Court: Justices were on a
spectrum, ranging from a Justice who was rarely willing to accommodate any proposed changes by a
potentially concurring or dissenting Justice once he had a majority of the Court, to a Justice who
usually accommodated changes by a potentially concurring or dissenting Justice even when he had a
large majority, to everything in between.
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proportional to the number of votes supporting the majority result at conference; if there were only five justices at conference voting to affirm the decision
of the lower court, and one of those five wishes significant changes to be made
in the draft, the opinion writer is under considerable pressure to work out
something that will satisfy the critic, in order to obtain the five votes for the
opinion.” More pithily, Rehnquist stated that once he had a majority for
an opinion, he was not inclined to accommodate other colleagues in order to
have a bigger majority because that would be “leaving cash on the table”
(Friedman 2011).
That said, Justices sometimes accommodate suggested changes even when
they already have a majority, and some Justices are more likely to accommodate
in this situation than others are (Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck 2000).3 What
should we make of Justices who go beyond a bare majority in building
the opinion coalition? Are they simply failing to act strategically, or do they
place less value on moving the law toward their ideal holding? We posit that
there is a strategic basis underlying coalition building beyond a bare majority.
Not only do Justices prefer to render an opinion that reflects their preferences;
they want their rulings to have staying power. Thus, an opinion author will
prefer a ruling that is some distance away from his or her ideal holding if
moving this distance increases the chances that precedent established by the
opinion will survive the test of time and scrutiny.
In a careful statistical analysis covering all cases decided in the 1953–2001
terms, we show that majority opinion coalitions composed of many and ideologically diverse Justices establish precedents that are less likely to be overruled
or negatively cited in the future. Our research design does not permit us to
distinguish whether subsequent courts are taking a cue from the ideological
breadth/size of the majority coalition or are less critical of the substantive
content of an opinion that was constructed to attract a broad majority. The
key point is that either adding more ideological breadth with a given number of
Justices or adding more Justices leads to an opinion that is likely to receive less
negative treatment. This produces a clear incentive for the majority opinion
author to add ideological breadth and, separately, to add members to the majority coalition in order to reduce the likelihood of negative treatment of the
opinion in the future.
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2. BACKGROUND AND THEORY

After oral argument in a case, the members of the Supreme Court have a conference at which each Justice votes and summarizes his or her reasoning. In
some cases, the Justices who voted in the majority at their conference are in
sufficient agreement among themselves, and in sufficient disagreement with
those who voted in the minority at conference, that after a draft majority
opinion is circulated, there is little potential for movement: those in the
4

Most judicial decisions in the federal system are rendered by lower court judges, who decide thousands of cases each year, very few of which are reviewed by the Supreme Court. What then-professor
Antonin Scalia (1978) said of administrative law is true of all areas of law—the Supreme Court is an
absentee landlord, and the lower courts are resident managers. Lower courts’ interpretations of the
Court’s precedents effectively determine the application and thus the meaning of those rulings.
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The issuance of Supreme Court opinions is only the beginning of a process:
the Supreme Court writes the opinions, but subsequent courts apply them.
These later actors’ decisions help to determine the influence and staying
power of Supreme Court decisions.4 And the data in this article indicate that
later citers respond better to decisions with broader coalitions. Opinions with
narrower coalitions encounter greater resistance. Opinion authors who fail to
accommodate their differently minded colleagues are likely to have a smaller
influence on the decisions of future courts.
Our findings offer two related insights into the behavior of Justices on the
U.S. Supreme Court. First, we identify a clear strategic incentive for Justices to
pursue an ideologically broad opinion coalition. This provides an explanation
for a behavior—authors accommodating colleagues beyond a simple majority—that previously appeared nonstrategic and difficult to explain with reference to Justices in pursuit of opinions close to their ideal holdings. Second, our
findings suggest moderation in equating ideologically contentious holdings
with precedents that survive the scrutiny of future courts. Though major
cases may be decided with ideological 5–4 splits, those opinions that garner
support from narrow coalitions are much more likely to be overruled or negatively cited by future courts.
Our assumption that Justices prefer for their precedents to be influential is
well established in the literature (Wahlbeck 1998, 614). In Section 2 of this
article, we discuss how this preference underlies our hypothesis that opinions
issued by broad coalitions will experience, on average, a lower incidence of
negative treatment by subsequent courts. In Section 3, we present an empirical
test of that hypothesis. In Section 4, we discuss the significance of our findings.
We conclude in Section 5.
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conference majority agree to the draft majority opinion with few changes
and those in the conference minority do not circulate memoranda requesting changes. But many cases are considerably more fluid. The Justice assigned
a majority opinion might circulate a draft among his or her colleagues and
receive memoranda in response indicating that Justice A joins without changes,
Justice B would join with modest changes, Justice C would join with different
changes, etc. Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck (2000, 61) show that “Justice
Brennan’s circulation records indicate that in 535 of the cases decided during
the Burger Court (23.4 percent), a justice tried to change the majority opinion
by sending a note to the majority opinion author recommending a specific
change in the opinion.” Additionally, Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck (2000)
break down Justices’ responses to a majority opinion among the categories of
Join Majority, Wait, Suggestion, Threat, Will Write, Circulate/Join Concur, and
Circulate/Join Dissent, and find that in 24.1 percent of cases a Justice made a
suggestion or threat seeking a change in the majority opinion. The result of
these various memoranda will often be a tradeoff for the drafting Justice between the closeness of the majority opinion to his or her draft opinion and the
size and composition of the majority (Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck 2000;
Maltzman & Wahlbeck 1996; Scalia 1994; Brenner 1980).
Justices frequently face such choices, and for a Justice who seeks to pull the
law toward his or her ideal holding, the obvious strategy might seem to be to
amass a bare majority that is closest to his or her desired position and go no
further. Having more than five Justices forces the opinion writer to move
further from his or her ideal holding. As to where Justices seek to pull opinions, a debate has long raged among scholars. Law professors have tended to
attribute the major role to legal considerations such as text, canons of construction, stare decisis, etc., with the political preferences of the Justices having
a smaller influence. Some political scientists have argued that this is wishful
thinking and have stressed the role of political preferences. This perspective is
embodied in the attitudinal model, which characterizes Justices as solely
pursuing their ideological objectives (George 1998; Segal & Spaeth 1993,
2002; Rohde & Spaeth 1976). Empirical studies have found support for the
attitudinal model (Hagle & Spaeth 1992, 1993; Segal & Cover 1989). And
there has been considerable cohesion among Justices across a wide range of
issues that have clear ideological valence and do not obviously cohere as a
jurisprudential matter—e.g., the Establishment Clause, affirmative action,
abortion, and, perhaps most (in)famously, the constitutionality of the counting methods authorized by the Florida Supreme Court in the 2000 presidential election.
This establishes an empirical puzzle. If the ideological content of the opinion
is all that matters, then why do majority opinion authors often work to build
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Central to our claim that opinion authors have a strategic, forward-looking
motive to establish an ideologically broad coalition is the proposition that
breadth improves an opinion’s treatment in subsequent cases. Indeed, the
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support beyond a simple majority? We see an explanation of this apparent
paradox in the role of opinions in establishing precedent.
The opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court contribute to the body
of precedents that subsequent courts draw upon. Studies have shown that
subsequent courts, particularly lower courts, are influenced by Supreme
Court precedents to varying degrees and do not respond equally to every opinion issued (Benesh & Reddick 2002; Spriggs & Hansford 2001; Songer, Segal, &
Cameron 1994; Canon 1973). Studies have also found that in terms of the
ideological composition of the majority coalition, the Supreme Court and
lower courts respond negatively to opinions issued by majority coalitions to
which they are ideologically opposed. Past opinions issued by majority coalitions that diverge ideologically from the current court fare worse in the citing
behavior of the current court. In a study of all orally argued cases decided
during the 1946–1995 terms, Spriggs & Hansford (2000) find that the likelihood
a precedent will be overruled is inversely related to the ideological proximity of
the median Justice in the majority coalition that established the precedent to the
median Justice on the current court. In other words, the Supreme Court is more
likely to overrule precedents established by coalitions of Justices that are ideologically distant from the current Court’s center. Additionally, Songer, Segal, &
Cameron (1994) find that in search and seizure cases, appellate panels that are,
on average, ideologically opposed to the Supreme Court’s ruling are less likely
to follow precedent. Hence, in terms of establishing durable law, the opinion
author needs to consider future ideological opposition as well as contemporaneous conflicts with his or her colleagues.
The influence of a ruling is short-lived if it is quickly overruled or regularly
rejected as inapplicable. If an opinion with a broader coalition is less likely to be
negatively treated by later courts, then making the concessions that attract a
broader majority coalition can be seen as a tradeoff between a large, short-term
shift in Court doctrine and a longer-lived, more moderate influence on the law.
In resolving this tradeoff, a strategic opinion author may seek to make concessions and broaden the opinion coalition in order to increase the influence of the
opinion. This raises the question of whether opinions established by broad
coalitions are more likely to stand the test of time than those arising from
narrow coalitions, and we now turn to that question.
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There is a negative correlation between the breadth of the majority coalition and the breadth of the
dissenting coalition. We have run the models with the breadth of the dissenting coalition included. If
the breadth of the majority coalition is included, the breadth of the dissenting coalition has no
significant effect. In the interest of reducing collinearity among the variables in the models, we
exclude the breadth of the dissenting coalition.

6

Shepard’s counts the number of citations to earlier cases that appear in dissenting opinions, but it
does not substantively analyze the dissenting opinions’ treatment of the earlier cases (perhaps because a dissent, by definition, did not persuade a majority of the citing court). Shepard’s substantive
analysis is reserved for citations that appear in majority and concurring opinions (“Checking a
Citation” 2008; Spriggs & Hansford 2000).

7

Shepard’s notes the fact of citation and does not add a substantive categorization. Such bare citations
are the majority of citations of any given cited case (Spriggs & Hansford 2000).

8

These categories (along with a count of the number of dissenting opinions citing a case) were once
the entirety of Shepard’s categories. After Lexis bought Shepard’s and put it online, Shepard’s added a
slew of additional categories for particular situations (e.g., “Quashed by—Used with Canadian cases
when a higher court has held that the decision of the lower court in the case you are Shepardizing
cannot stand, primarily on jurisdictional grounds”) (Shepard’s Alphabetic List (2008)). The nine
categories listed are the main ones, however. Given that these are the main categories, they are also
the ones that Spriggs & Hansford tested for reliability.
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absence of such a relationship between breadth and treatment would disconfirm our hypothesis that this strategic incentive exists. We use data from
Shepard’s Citations to study the subsequent treatment of opinions issued by
the Supreme Court (Spriggs & Hansford 2000). The analyses of Corley (2009),
Spriggs & Hansford (2001), and Benesh & Reddick (2002) serve as the basis for
our empirical models. We extend these specifications to account for the ideological breadth, in terms of Martin–Quinn scores, of the majority opinion coalition (Jacobi & Sag 2009; Martin, Quinn, & Epstein 2005; Martin & Quinn
2002). 5
Following Corley (2009), we use the coding in the Shepard’s database to
measure the subsequent treatment of Supreme Court majority opinions.
Shepard’s tracks (and has tracked for decades) the subsequent history of judicial
opinions. This history includes every reference to an opinion in a later opinion,
law review article, brief, treatise, statute, etc. Shepard’s also examines every
published state and federal court opinion to see which earlier opinions it
cites. Shepard’s analyzes the citations contained in the main opinion and any
concurrences.6 If a given citation refers to a case but has no substantive reaction
to it, Shepard’s does not put the citation into a substantive category.7 Shepard’s
divides all the remaining citations (that is, all citations that contain substantive
responses to the cited case) into the following main categories: Overruled,
Criticized, Questioned, Limited, Distinguished, Explained, Harmonized,
Paralleled, or Followed (Spriggs & Hansford 2000).8 Shepard’s characterizes
the first four of these categories as “strong” negative treatment (with
Overruling of course being the strongest), and if a cited opinion has been
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They also took a random sample of Supreme Court cases, found all citations in them, and checked
their list of citations against Shepard’s list of citations, to see if Shepard’s missed any citations. They
found that Shepard’s had an accuracy rate of 100 percent (Spriggs & Hansford 2000).
Further, they took another random sample of Supreme Court cases, found all subsequent
Supreme Court opinions referring to one of them, and then read the resulting sample of 252
cases to determine whether the citing case merely mentioned the cited case without any substantive
treatment or gave some substantive signal. Only the latter should be put into one of Shepard’s
substantive categories (e.g., Questioned, Followed, etc.); the others would have no categorization
(or treatment). Spriggs & Hansford (2000) found that their coding agreed with Shepard’s 88.5
percent of the time, which they note “is 68.3% greater than would be expected by chance and
thus indicates ‘substantial’ intercoder agreement.”

10 The authors did not conduct a reliability analysis of Parallel, because Shepard’s applied it only four
times during the time period of their survey (Spriggs & Hansford 2000). Robert Anderson (2009)
conducted additional testing of Shepard’s treatments and found them to be reliable and valid.
11 For any given overruling there will be many readers who prefer the original opinion, and many who
believe that the Court rejected its earlier opinion not because it was unsound but because of a change
in composition of the Court. But this does not change the fact that the later Court presented its
overruling in terms of the alleged unsoundness of the earlier opinion. There is no getting around the
fact that these are usually rejections on the merits.
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subject to such negative treatment, Shepard’s lists a “warning” with that cited
opinion. Shepard’s treats Distinguished as mildly negative, Paralleled and
Followed as positive, and Explained or Harmonized as neutral (Spriggs &
Hansford 2000).
Spriggs & Hansford (2000) undertook a careful study to measure the reliability of Shepard’s Citations. They took a random stratified sample of Supreme
Court cases citing earlier Supreme Court cases, yielding 602 citing opinions,
and they coded all the citing opinions according to the coding rules in the
Shepard’s training manual.9 They found high levels of agreement between
their coding and Shepard’s coding. Notably for our purposes, the negative
categories of Overruled, Limited, Questioned, and Criticized were particularly
reliable, with agreement between their and Shepard’s coding of 99.5 percent,
99.0 percent, 96.4 percent, and 94.5 percent, respectively (Spriggs & Hansford
2000). The mildly negative category Distinguished had 87.9 percent agreement.
The positive and neutral categories were less reliable, although they still had
fairly high levels of agreement, ranging from 79.1 percent to 94.7 percent
(Spriggs & Hansford 2000).10
Note that the negative categories represent a spectrum of responses. Only the
Supreme Court can overrule one of its own cases, so Overruled represents the
Supreme Court’s rejection of its own work.11 Criticized, Questioned, and
Limited, in contrast, include negative treatments from all courts. And, as
noted above, these are not bare citations; in each case, the citing court indicates
disapproval. Specifically, Shepard’s Citations (2008) defines Criticized as “disagree[ing] with the reasoning/result” of a case, Questioned as “question[ing]
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12 Note that we aggregate subsequent treatments over the type of citing court (e.g., Supreme or appellate). We see this as the appropriate approach for two reasons. First, aggregation offers greater
leverage on the overall response of the judicial community to an opinion. The frequency of negative
treatment is low to begin with, and we would create an even more sparse measure if we were to
subset the data by the type of citing court. Second, we have no theoretical reason to expect that
Justices on different types of courts will respond differently to the features of a majority opinion.
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the continuing validity or precedential value” of a case, and Limited as “restrict[ing] the application of the case you are Shepardizing.”
On positive versus negative citations, not all of the findings in this article
apply to the central positive treatment Followed (the only other positive treatment, Paralleled, is too rare to yield reliable results). We do not focus on
Followed for two reasons. First, overruling, criticizing, questioning, or limiting
a case is a stronger signal than is following a case. That is, choosing to overrule,
criticize, question, or limit a case is a more negative reaction than following a
case is a positive one. Second, Spriggs & Hansford found that Followed was less
reliable than the negative signals (81.9 percent agreement between Spriggs &
Hansford’s blind recoding and Shepard’s).
To test our hypothesis that opinions issued by broad opinion coalitions will
fare better in subsequent cases, we estimate five regression models predicting
negative treatment according to the Shepard’s classifications. We assemble a
dataset of all cases decided during the 1953–2008 terms. In four of the models,
the dependent variable is the count of the respective citation instances that
occurred before the end of the 2008 term for the citation categories
Criticized, Questioned, Limited, and Distinguished. Overruled, a binary indicator of whether an opinion was overruled by the end of the 2008 term, is the
dependent variable in the fifth model. Note that there is a single observation for
each case in the dataset. We aggregate over citing cases, giving the number or
indicator of the respective citation type up to the 2008 term. It may, at first
glance, appear that we should standardize our dependent variables by the
number of times a case has been cited. Many cases are never cited, however,
which leads to a zero denominator in this measure. Our central theoretical
results are unchanged if we include in the regressions the number of total
citations, but due to concerns about endogeneity, we elect to report the
models without total citations on the right-hand side.
Our dependent variables are summarized in Table 1.12 We see that the
strong negative treatments occur with considerable rarity relative to the moderately negative Distinguished. Most of the opinions covered by our dataset
are never cited in a strong negative manner. Overruling is particularly rare.
Approximately 3 percent of Supreme Court cases are overruled. Figure 1 disaggregates the incidence of negative treatment by the term the opinion was
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Table 1.

Minimum
Median
Mean
Maximum
SD

Negative Treatment of Supreme Court Cases: Descriptive Statistics
Overruled

Criticized

Questioned

Limited

Distinguished

0.000
0.000
0.030
1.000
0.169

0.000
0.000
0.494
46.000
1.553

0.000
0.000
0.875
285.000
7.132

0.000
0.000
0.053
6.000
0.284

0.000
6.000
16.414
2188.000
52.576

Estimates based on 7,181 cases decided during the 1953–2008 terms.

13 Our findings regarding the negative effect of breadth hold if the sample standard deviation of the
Martin–Quinn scores of the Justices in the majority opinion coalition is the measure of opinion
coalition breadth.
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written. If negative citation were simply a constant risk to any opinion, then
these plots would depict a strictly decreasing likelihood of negative treatment as
decisions become more recent. As more time passes, given a constant risk of
negative citation at any given point in time, the likelihood an opinion has been
negatively cited should simply increase with the age of the opinion. This is not
the case. We see in Figure 1 that there is much interesting variation in the risk of
negative treatment. Indeed, cases decided in the late 1980s and early 1990s are at
least as likely to have received at least one criticizing and/or questioning citation
as cases decided in the 1960s. We now turn to the specification of models for
these outcomes.
Our primary independent variable of interest is the breadth of the Ideological
Interval constituted by the majority opinion coalition. To identify this variable
we first construct the group of Justices that authored/signed the majority/
plurality opinion in a case using the Opinion and Vote variables in the
Supreme Court Database (SCDB, http://scdb.wustl.edu). We then identify the
Ideological Interval of a case to be the difference between the maximum and
minimum Martin–Quinn scores of the Justices in the majority opinion coalition, using the scores for the term in which the case was decided. We expect that
this variable will have a negative effect on all of the dependent variables—the
broader the opinion coalition, the lower the incidence of negative citation.13 We
also account for a number of potential confounding covariates, following the
specifications in Spriggs & Hansford (2001), Benesh & Reddick (2002), and
Corley (2009). We detail these variables below.
We also include the variable Majority Size, the number of Justices in the
majority opinion coalition. Both Spriggs & Hansford (2001) and Benesh &
Reddick (2002) find that opinions issued by unanimous courts are treated
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Figure 1. Proportion of Decisions Receiving Negative Treatment by the End of the 2008
Term (a) Overruled, (b) Criticized, (c) Questioned, (d) Limited, and (e) Distinguished.
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14 Our findings regarding the negative effect of breadth hold if we use a unanimity indicator rather
than the count of Majority Size. However, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) indicates the
count has better explanatory power.
15 These data are available at http://www.psci.unt.edu/pmcollins/data.htm.
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better by subsequent courts. Also, Corley (2009) finds that plurality opinions
are less likely to be complied with by lower courts. We use a more informative
measure in the count because of the obvious potential pitfall of collinearity with
our primary independent variable of interest. Larger opinion coalitions will
tend to have broader ideological intervals. Indeed, the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient between Ideological Interval and Majority Size is 0.49. If we omit
or incompletely account for the effect of the size of the coalition, we may
inaccurately attribute the effect of coalition size to the ideological breadth of
the coalition. This omission would be particularly problematic since it is probably the case that Justices are more likely to join opinions that are, based on
the quality of legal reasoning or other factors, less likely to be negatively treated.
A model that does not account for the size of the majority runs the risk of
attributing this strategic anticipation to the effect of Ideological Interval. We
expect Majority Size to have a negative effect on the incidence of negative
citation.14
As we noted above, Spriggs & Hansford (2001) find that the Supreme Court
is more likely to overrule opinions issued by majority coalitions with ideological
medians far from the Court’s current ideological median. To account for this
we construct the variable Ideological Divergence. We first identify the median
Martin–Quinn score among the Justices in the voting majority on each case.
Ideological Divergence is then measured as the average absolute difference between the median on the case and the median on the Court over the terms
between the decision and 2008. So, if the median Justice in the voting majority
in case A, decided in the 2006 term, has a Martin–Quinn score of 1, and the
median Martin–Quinn score on the Court in terms 2006, 2007, and 2008 are
2, 1, and 2, respectively, then Ideological Divergence for case A is the average
of {j1  (2)j, j1  (1)j, j1  2j} ¼ 2. We expect that this variable will increase
the incidence of negative citation.
We also consider the effect of the salience of a case. It is possible that more
salient cases are considered more often by subsequent courts and therefore cited
negatively more often. Following Collins (2004), we use the number of amicus
curiae briefs filed in a case to measure the salience of a case. We expect this
variable, Amicus Briefs, to have a positive influence on the frequency of negative
treatment.15 This is an important effect to control for given the possibility that
organizations and individuals file briefs in cases anticipated to be controversial
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(in particular, those likely to produce ideological 5–4 splits). Also, this will
control for the possibility that ideologically broad and large coalitions arise
in noncontroversial cases. If the Amicus Briefs variable were omitted, this
could confound our findings with regard to the size and breadth of the majority.
Spriggs & Hansford (2001) find that cases addressing statutory issues,
as opposed to questions of constitutionality, are less likely to be overruled.
We include Statutory, an indicator that assumes the value 1 if the case addressed
a statutory issue according to the lawType variable in SCDB. It is expected
that this variable will have a negative effect on the incidence of negative
treatment.
Benesh & Reddick (2002) find that lower courts are significantly more likely
to adhere to the Supreme Court’s reversal of a precedent if the members of
the Court that established the original precedent are no longer on the Court.
This tendency to adhere to a reversal of a precedent can be interpreted as a
negative treatment of that precedent by the lower court. We reason that the
incidence of negative treatment will be higher for opinions existing through
many terms where the members of the opinion’s majority coalition are no
longer on the Court. We include the variable Justices Remaining, which is the
mean proportion of the original majority opinion coalition that remains on the
Court in the terms following the decision, up to the 2008 term. In order to
construct this measure for each case, we first construct a vector that records the
proportion of the justices in the majority opinion coalition who remain on the
Court, for each term from the one after the opinion was issued until 2008. We
then take the arithmetic mean of this vector for each case. We expect that this
measure will exercise a negative influence on the incidence of negative citation.
Both Spriggs & Hansford (2001) and Benesh & Reddick (2002) find that
more complex opinions, in terms of the number of legal issues and provisions
they address, are more likely to be negatively treated by subsequent courts. We
use the number of legal issues and/or provisions addressed in an opinion to
constitute our measure of Complexity. This measure is equivalent to the number
of rows occupied by a case in the “Legal Provisions” version of the
case-organized SCDB.
We also include a measure of uncertainty on the Court regarding the legal
justification of its ruling. Spriggs & Hansford (2001) find that the risk of overruling increases with the number of concurring opinions authored in the case. It
is particularly important that we account for this effect, because the presence of
acceptable alternative legal arguments could cause both the breadth of the
majority coalition and the likelihood of future negative treatment, thus confounding the primary relationship of interest in our study. We use the Opinion
and Vote variables in SCDB to create the variable Concurrences—the number of
concurring opinions authored in each case. It is expected that the incidence of
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16 Diagnostics with the AIC indicate that higher order polynomials do not improve the fit of the model.
17 Specifically, we use the version of generalized Poisson regression implemented in the vglm() function available in the VGAM package (Yee 2010) for the R statistical software suite (“VGAM”). We
also considered the negative binomial distribution, but the AIC indicated that the generalized
Poisson fit the data better in each of the four count models.
18 To be sure, we compared the cloglog functional form to a logit, and the AIC confirms that the
cloglog fits the data better in our case. This is estimated using the glm() function in R.
19 The regression models are estimated on cases decided in the 1954–2001 terms because these are the
dates for which the Amicus Briefs variable is available. We estimated the models on cases spanning
the 1953–2008 terms, and the sign/significance findings of the other variables, including Ideological
Interval, were the same as the models covering the 1954–2001 terms (i.e., those reported herein).

Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ at Duke University on April 1, 2013

negative treatment will increase with the number of concurring opinions
authored.
It is reasonable to expect that a case will accumulate more negative citations
the longer it is exposed to scrutiny. To account for exposure we include a
quadratic in the number of terms since the case was decided (until 2008).
This function is represented by the Terms (number of terms) and Terms2
(number of terms squared) variables in the models. It is expected that the
number of negative citations will increase with time exposed.16
We carefully select the specific estimators to conform closely to the properties
of our dependent variable. When modeling count data, it is important to account for the facts that (i) the dependent variable can only assume nonnegative
integer values and (ii) the mean and variance may not be equal (i.e., there may
be under- or overdispersion), as is the case with the Poisson distribution (King
1989). For the count variables, we use the generalized Poisson distribution
proposed by Consul (1989), which properly accounts for these two properties.17
For Overruled, we use a regression model designed for binary rare events, since
the incidence in our sample is only 3 percent. Similar to logit, the “cloglog”
model, a generalized linear model using a complementary log-log link function,
is more appropriate for skewed binary data (i.e., rare events) (Buckley &
Westerland 2004). We use the cloglog model for Overruled.18
The regression results are given in Table 2.19 The estimates are supportive
of our central hypothesis. In four of the five models, the effect of the breadth of
the Ideological Interval is negative, and the effect is statistically significant at the
0.05 level (one-tailed) in three of the models. The effect is negative but not
significant in the model for Distinguished. In the Limited model, the effect is
positive, but not significant. Following the findings of Ward, Greenhill, & Bakke
(2010) that p-values alone should not serve as a basis for concluding that a
variable contributes to the fit of a statistical model, we use the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1974) to identify the contribution of
Ideological Interval to the fit of each model. We do this by estimating each
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Regression Models of Supreme Court Case Treatment (1954–2001)

Ideological Divergence
Statutory
Concurrences
Justices Remaining
Complexity

Majority Size
Ideological Interval
Intercept
Terms
Terms2
Dispersion
Change in AIC

Criticized

Questioned

Limited

Distinguished

0.054
(0.122)
 0.359*
(0.153)
0.276*
(0.089)
 3.008*
(1.234)
0.051
(0.041)
0.014
(0.016)
 0.206*
(0.061)
 0.08*
(0.042)
0.02
(1.645)
 0.01
(0.053)
0.001
(0.001)
–

0.032
(0.044)
 0.117*
(0.051)
0.243*
(0.032)
 0.283
(0.37)
0.022
(0.018)
0.012*
(0.005)
 0.173*
(0.021)
 0.026*
(0.015)
 0.006
(0.523)
0.04
(0.017)
 0.001
( < .0001)
0.894*
(0.031)
1

0.048
(0.056)
0.082
(0.063)
0.188*
(0.041)
 0.817*
(0.494)
0.029
(0.021)
0.016*
(0.007)
 0.123*
(0.026)
 0.044*
(0.018)
 1.097
(0.683)
0.052
(0.022)
 0.001
( < .0001)
2.196*
(0.065)
4

0.172*
(0.102)
 0.119
(0.121)
0.127
(0.079)
 0.912
(0.993)
0.048
(0.036)
0.021
(0.014)
 0.122*
(0.049)
0.02
(0.033)
 4.002
(1.352)
0.114
(0.044)
 0.002
(0.001)
0.375*
(0.049)
2

0.084*
(0.022)
0.023
(0.024)
0.193*
(0.016)
0.243
(0.182)
0.041*
(0.009)
0.011*
(0.003)
 0.086*
(0.01)
 0.003
(0.007)
0.9
(0.256)
0.031
(0.008)
 0.001
( < .0001)
2.524*
(0.023)
2

2

N ¼ 5,793 in each model. The dependent variable in every model besides that for “overruled” is
the count of the number of respective citations. In “overruled” the outcome is a binary indicator
of an overruling decision.
*Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level (one-tailed). Change in AIC is the change in the
AIC resulting from removing Ideological Interval from the model. The positive and signiﬁcant
values of the dispersion parameter indicate that there is overdispersion relative to the Poisson
distribution.

model with and without Ideological Interval and record the Change in AIC as the
difference in AIC that occurs from removing Ideological Interval (i.e., AIC
(without Ideological Interval)  AIC (with Ideological Interval)). This measure
is computed such that a positive value of Change in AIC indicates model improvement from adding Ideological Interval. Inferences based on p-values and
model fit align in our analysis. In the models for Overruled, Criticized,
and Questioned, the AIC is lower when Ideological Interval is in the model.
The values of Change in AIC for Limited and Distinguished indicate that
Ideological Interval should not be in the model. Overall, our hypothesis that
Ideological Interval reduces the incidence of negative treatment of a precedent is
supported by the analysis.
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Amicus Briefs

Overruled
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20 Note that this rarity does not diminish the importance to judicial scholars of understanding negative
treatment. Significant shifts in legal rules are often catalyzed by the negative treatment of established
precedent. Also note that some of the interpretation may appear as if we are discussing an interaction term between Majority Size and Ideological Interval. However, this is due to the nonlinear (i.e.,
multiplicative) relationship between the covariates and the expected value of the dependent variable,
and not due to the actual inclusion of an interaction effect.
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Evaluations of statistical significance and improvements in model fit do
not convey the substantive significance of the effect of ideological breadth.
Figure 2 presents the expected values of the negative citation variables, conditioned on the value of Ideological Interval given majority sizes of five, six, and
seven Justices, for the models in which Ideological Interval has a significant
negative effect. Numerically, these effects may seem moderate, but they are
substantively large. Because all forms of negative treatment constitute relatively
rare events, the difference between an ideologically narrow and ideologically
broad opinion coalition may well determine whether an opinion is ever treated
negatively, and it would be alarming to see a particularly large magnitude of the
effects of ideological breadth since large magnitudes of negative treatment are
particularly uncommon.20 In Figure 2a, the most damaging form of negative
citation, overruling, is considerably affected by Ideological Interval. Regardless
of the size of the majority coalition, the probability of an overruling citation,
albeit low in all instances, is 50–70 percent lower when the majority coalition
is ideologically broad than when the coalition is ideologically narrow. In
Figure 2b, we see that moving from the minimum Ideological Interval (<1)
to the maximum (approximately 10) reduces the expected number of criticizing
citations by approximately 0.1–0.2. In terms of questioning citations
(Figure 2c), we see that given a majority coalition with six Justices, an opinion
issued by a very narrow majority coalition is expected to be questioned approximately 30 percent more than the average opinion, whereas cases with a
very broad coalition are expected to be questioned approximately 15 percent
less than the average opinion. Additionally, it is informative to note that the
effect of coalition breadth is on par with that of coalition size. Specifically, the
change in negative treatment when moving from line to line (i.e., the effect of
coalition size) is comparable to that when moving along any given line (i.e., the
effect of coalition breadth). This reinforces the notion that majority opinion
authors can prevent negative treatment of opinions by attracting an ideologically broad coalition of Justices.
In terms of the control variables, many of the effects align with our expectations. Most notably, Majority Size, the number of Justices in the majority
coalition, has a negative and significant effect on the incidence of negative
citation in each model. Concurrences, the number of concurring opinions
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Figure 2. Effect of Ideological Coalition Breadth on the Subsequent Negative
Treatment of Precedents. The Dashed Gray Bar is Placed at the Sample Mean of
the Dependent Variable in Each Plot. In the “Rug Plot” at the Bottom of Each Plot, a
Vertical Line is Drawn at Each Observed Value of the Ideological Interval. (a) Probability
of an Overruling Citation; (b) Expected Number of Criticizing Citations; and (c) Expected
Number of Questioning Citations.
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4. DISCUSSION

The data indicate that cases with narrow Supreme Court coalitions are more
likely to be treated negatively by later courts. This is true on two different
metrics of narrowness: the ideological breadth represented by the Justices
who join the majority opinion and the number of Justices who join the majority
opinion. Adding either ideological breadth or a new member to the majority
coalition results in an opinion that is less likely to be overruled, criticized, or
questioned.
Our data include a single observation for each cited case, aggregating
over potential citing opinions. It would be useful to evaluate our hypotheses
in the dyadic setting, such as that in Westerland et al. (2010), testing
whether individual citing cases are more likely to negatively cite opinions established by an ideologically narrow coalition. However, in the current analysis,
we do much to account for the aggregated effects of potential citing opinions.
First, through the quadratic function of the number of terms an opinion has
existed, we account for increased exposure over time. Second, through our
measure of Ideological Divergence, we account for variance in the overall ideological hostility to which an opinion is subject over time. Third, through our
measure of Justices Remaining, we account for the potential effects of turnover
on the likelihood of citing cases negatively treating the opinions. In sum,
though the dyadic analysis would be a worthy pursuit for future research,
there is no reason to believe that our results are confounded by aggregation
over the citing cases.
If a narrower coalition means a greater likelihood of an opinion being treated
negatively by later courts, the incentives facing opinion writers become more
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authored in each case, increases the incidence of negative citation in each model
and is statistically significant in every model but the one for Overruled. Also,
more complex cases, as measured by the number of legal provisions and issues
addressed by an opinion, experience a higher incidence of negative citation. We
basically have null findings with regard to the ideological divergence between
the median of the opinion coalition and future courts. The effect is positive, as
expected, in every model, but only significant in the model for Distinguished.
Also, in terms of the salience of cases measured by Amicus Briefs, we find that
the more salient a case, the greater the instance of negative treatment in each
model—an effect that is significant in three of the five models. We have mixed
results with regard to Statutory cases and Justices Remaining, with some nonsignificant, positive-significant, and negative-significant findings for these two
variables.
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21 Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck (2000) provide some evidence in support of this assumption. A
Justice’s greater ideological distance from the author of a draft majority opinion is positively
correlated with that Justice seeking changes in the draft opinion as a condition for joining the
opinion.
22 Recall that the effect of ideological breadth on negative treatments controls for the correlation
between the number of Justices joining the majority opinion and negative treatments. So an ideological 5–4 decision is treated worse than a nonideological 5–4 decision is.
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complex. Accommodating an ideologically distant colleague may entail a significant move from the author’s ideal holding. That is, ordinarily we would
expect that accommodating an ideologically distant colleague would entail a
greater change in the draft opinion than accommodating an ideologically
close colleague would.21 Similarly, accommodating a potentially dissenting or
nonjoining concurring Justice who is not needed for purposes of forming a
majority likely means moving the opinion away from the drafting Justice’s ideal
position. But the data show that bringing in potential dissenters, potential
nonjoining concurrers, or ideologically distant colleagues is associated with a
significant benefit—fewer negative treatments, meaning the long-term influence of a precedent. Note that we do not present any evidence that majority
opinion authors choose to compose broadly appealing opinions in order to
avoid future negative treatment. Rather, we demonstrate that opinion authors
have an incentive to attract a broad ideological coalition in order to avoid
future negative treatment of the opinion.
We note a possible pitfall in drawing inferences about the direction of
causality with regard to the number of Justices joining the majority. This
does not necessarily mean that reducing the number of dissenters or nonjoining
concurrers in a given case will reduce the negative treatments of that case.
It could be that Supreme Court Justices are good judges of quality: more
Justices dissent, or concur without joining the majority opinion, when they
think the quality of the majority opinion is low, and they are correct in their
judgments.
This reasoning does not explain the negative correlation between ideological
breadth and negative treatments.22 In addition, one of its assumptions fails
because adding potential dissenters/nonjoining concurrers involves a change
in the majority opinion (i.e., the change comes before the joining). The relevant
universe is Justices who are potential dissenters/nonjoining concurrers. By hypothesis, we are talking about a situation in which a Justice has circulated
a draft opinion and has been able to garner the support of enough Justices
(with whatever changes they may have requested as a condition of their joining)
to form a majority of the Court. The question involves any Justices who have
not joined the draft opinion and thus are potential dissenters/nonjoining
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23 Obviously, if they have joined the draft opinion, then they are already in the majority.
24 We cannot rule out the possibility of other circumstances—e.g., vote trading, in which a Justice
agrees to trade her vote in case X for another Justice’s vote in case Y—but there is zero evidence for
them. Thus, although we say “almost always,” there is no factual basis for the “almost.”
25 In this discussion the terms “narrower” and “narrowly” refer to legal narrowness, whereas elsewhere
in our article, in discussions of coalition building, we usually refer to ideological narrowness.

Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ at Duke University on April 1, 2013

concurrers.23 One or more Justices may be convinced that the case should be
affirmed rather than reversed (or vice versa) and thus unwilling to join any
conceivable opinion that the majority would also adopt. But there may be
potential dissenters/nonjoining concurrers who would be willing to join the
majority opinion under the right circumstances. Such circumstances are almost
always (if not always) specified changes to the majority opinion: Justices offer
to join the draft opinion if changes are made to it (Hammond, Bonneau, &
Sheehan 2005; Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck 2000).24 That is, just as some
who already joined the majority may have done so because the drafter accommodated their concerns, so, too, may the drafter accommodate the concerns of
those who are not necessary to constitute a majority. Maltzman & Wahlbeck
(1996, 583) give one example: in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), Justice
Rehnquist voted at Conference to affirm and was in the minority. After Justice
Marshall circulated a draft majority, Justice Rehnquist stated: “I voted to affirm
in this case at Conference, but before writing a dissent to Thurgood’s proposed
opinion I think I will wait to see if anything narrower. . . is written.”25
Marshall circulated a new draft opinion that was narrower than the previous
version (Marshall cut a discussion addressing the state’s exclusionary rule). As
Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck (2000, 99) note, “Marshall’s decision to limit
the breadth of his opinion was rewarded when Rehnquist joined his opinion to
reverse. . . . Rehnquist was willing to abandon his preferred outcome in order to
ensure that the majority opinion was narrowly drawn.”
It may also be that later courts use the number of dissenters/nonjoining
concurrers (and the identity of those in the majority) as proxies for value
and quality. In such a situation, we would expect that a simple vote switch
from dissenter/nonjoining concurrer to the majority opinion would be correlated with a decrease in negative treatments. From the standpoint of the majority drafter, it does not matter much whether the changes requested by a
potential dissenter/nonjoining concurrer are making the majority less likely
to receive negative treatments (i.e., the changes improve the quality of the
opinion in the eyes of citing courts) or the mere addition of another person
to the majority is doing all the work (i.e., changes requested by the potential
dissenter/nonjoining concurrer do not improve the quality of the opinion in the
eyes of citing courts, or perhaps even decrease it, but the addition of a member
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to the majority is such a strongly positive signal that citing courts are less likely
to treat the opinion negatively on that basis alone). The reason it does not
matter to the majority writer is that potential dissenters/nonjoining concurrers
do ask for changes as a price for their joining. The two are a package. So whether
it is the substance of the changes or the addition of a Justice does not matter,
because the two cannot be separated.
Now we turn to the negative correlation between ideological breadth
and strongly negative citations. Recall that this correlation is separate
from that involving the number of members of the majority coalition:
given majority coalitions of the same size, ideological narrowness is correlated
with more negative treatments. In terms of the choices facing the author
of a majority opinion, the question is whether, in choosing whom to accommodate and bring into the majority coalition, he or she chooses a Justice who
is ideologically more similar. Let’s say, for example, a moderately conservative
Justice has circulated a majority opinion that has garnered four votes (including
his or her own), and he or she has received a memo from a conservative
Justice that would pull the opinion in one direction and a memo from a liberal
Justice that would pull it in the opposite direction. The data presented in
this article indicate that there is a benefit to accommodating the more
ideologically distant colleague (here, the liberal Justice): the resulting opinion
will receive fewer negative citations. This finding contradicts the strategic
conception put forth by Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck (2000) that opinion
authors should strive to achieve ideologically narrow, minimum winning
coalitions.
Our findings indicate that a majority opinion author who compromises
on content to attract ideologically diverse signatories will be rewarded with
greater staying power of the opinion. As we noted above, accommodating an
ideologically distant colleague is likely to entail a bigger shift from the author’s
preferences than accommodating an ideologically close colleague would.
Accommodating an ideologically distant colleague may produce opinions
that are in some sense better (e.g., better reasoned) or simply attractive to a
broader range of later courts (because the opinion had to have broad appeal in
order to gain the votes of an ideologically diverse coalition on the Court). Or
it may be that later citers are not responding to the substance of the opinion,
and instead rely entirely on the ideological breadth of the majority coalition.
That is, as with the size of the coalition, later courts may be responding to
substantive changes involved in the author’s accommodating an ideologically
distant Justice. Also, it is possible that the ideological breadth of the opinion
coalition sends a cue of broad acceptability to later citing courts. Later citers
may view a broad coalition as an indicator that the content of an opinion is not
ideologically offensive to either side of the spectrum. Whatever the internal
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5. CONCLUSION

Many scholars have focused on Justices’ votes in cases and have largely ignored
the later reception of a given opinion. Considering only the consequences in the
present, the seemingly obvious practice for a strategic Justice, and a common
practice as an empirical matter, is for a Justice to stop accommodating once he
or she garners a majority in support of the majority opinion. The assumption is
that there is little or no benefit to adding Justices.26 Our data show that the
matter is a good deal more complex, because broader coalitions are associated
with opinions that have greater staying power. This enriches (and complicates)
the considerations for Justices, particularly the Justice writing the majority
opinion.
26 For what it is worth, the conventional wisdom among the fellow Supreme Court clerks of one of the
authors was that the Justices who stopped accommodating their colleagues once their opinions had
garnered five votes were the strategic ones. They kept their majority opinions closer to their ideal
holding by refusing to budge once they had a majority, and this seemed like the strategically
sophisticated course to take. The data in this article, however, suggest that we were too hasty in
our judgment. Maybe seemingly profligate accommodation is the most strategic policy of all.
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process through which later citers favor opinions with broader ideological coalitions, our results show that Supreme Court majority opinion authors can
render their contributions more resistant to future criticism by attracting the
support of ideologically distant colleagues.
As with the number of dissenters, from the standpoint of the author of the
majority opinion, later citers’ internal motivations are of little consequence: the
question is which Justice(s) will join the author’s majority coalition, and the
price of such joining is accommodating requested changes. It makes no difference to the author whether the substance of the changes or the mere fact of
having an ideologically distant Justice as part of the coalition is doing the work,
because the two go together.
All these findings point in the same direction: opinion writers who can assemble broad, ideologically diverse coalitions are less likely to have opinions
that are treated poorly. These findings thus present in a new and different light
the choices facing an opinion writer. Some Justices assigned a majority opinion
stop accommodating their colleagues once they get to five and others accommodate even when they have more than five. It turns out that this choice
appears to have significant implications for the impact of the relevant opinion.
That is, the data presented here yield useful information related to questions
about the long-term influence of opinions, and thus the tradeoffs facing authors
of majority opinions, and the actual influence of ideology on precedent.
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